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RETRIBUTION: THE CENTRAL
AIM OF PUNISHMENT
GERARD V. BRADLEY
When I worked for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office in the
early 1980s, criminal sentences were consistently and dramatically
too lenient. Though those years marked the ebb tide for the
rehabilitative ideal of punishment and indeterminate "zip-to-ten"
sentences, only career felons and those convicted of the most serious
crimes were candidates for the sentences they justly deserved. The
problem was not all theoretical; the chief difficulty was the simple
lack of custodial space. With the city jail at Riker's Island bulging at
the seams and prison space upstate scarce, the situation could best be
described as get-out-of-jail-free for all but the most dangerous
offenders.
Most people, however, were furious about crime and seemed to
have collectively decided that they would do whatever was required
to retake the streets, the parks, and the subways, almost all of which
were hazardous after dark and some of which continued to be
dangerous even during the day. This "get-tough" attitude towards
crime matured shortly after Charles Bronson, as Paul Kersey in Death
Wish, attempted to single-handedly eliminate crime from New York's
streets.I Hamstrung by apparently silly rules of constitutional
etiquette and bureaucratic sclerosis, the police were eclipsed in the
mind of the public by the cold-blooded Everyman, bound only by the
law of the jungle and some elusive sense of justice.2 Ultimately,
popular demand required greater sentences for career criminals, a
corresponding increase in prison capacities, and more police officers
patrolling the streets.
I do not mean to criticize the results of the aggressive policies
adopted during that period. But I do mean to argue that deterrence and
1. DEATH WISH (Paramount Pictures 1974).
2. See id. In the movie, Bronson's character lashes out against urban violence after his
daughter is raped and his wife murdered within the presumed safety of their New York
apartment.
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incapacitation are not adequate bases for sentencing those convicted
of crimes. Neither, ultimately, is rehabilitation. These goals may
contribute to a sound account of punishment-they may be secondary
aims of punishment-but none can, on its own, morally justify
punishment.3 Only retribution, a concept consistently misunderstood
or entirely forgotten during the time I practiced criminal law, justifies
punishing criminals.
My aim in this paper is to present retribution as the morally
justifying aim of punishment. The need to do so is well demonstrated
by a dreary episode from my experience before a certain judge in the
New York City Criminal Court. Also a professor at a local law
school, this judge was known as a notoriously soft sentencer; indeed,
he seemed to have missed his calling to either social work or
psychoanalysis. Near the close of one particularly frustrating day in
his courtroom, I recalled a principle of successful debate whereby one
embraces the stated goals of the opposition and then explains that his
proffered means are the best means to achieve those goals.
Consequently, during sentencing, I argued that the best way to "help"
this particular defendant was the distinctive way that criminal justice,
insofar as it meant to "help" defendants at all, characteristically
helped them: not by sending them to some bogus program, but by
punishing them. The accused had incurred a debt to society which he
had to repay. By punishing the defendant, the judge would set things
right between him and the community. The judge said nothing,
instead seemingly coming unstuck in time. His blank,
uncomprehending stare struck me much as the empty look of a
lobotomized bovine: vacant, confused, and unknowing. I had clearly
gone beyond his experience, and beyond that of most sitting judges at
that time. I suspect that many people fail to understand the concept of
retribution even today.
I. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT RESTITUTION
First, retribution is not lex talionis, the law of retaliation, or "an eye
for an eye." 4 A few societies may have tried to apply such a norm
3. For a discussion of how such secondary aims might properly be integrated into a
coherent account of punishment morally justified by retribution, see Gerard V. Bradley,
Retribution and the Secondary Aims of Punishment, 45 AM. J. JUR. 105 (1999).
4. Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21. Although typically attributed to
Scripture, the concept also appears prominently in other sources, such as the Code of
Hammurabi.
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literally, but I doubt that any has actually done so consistently.
Rather, societies typically deprive criminals of human resources-
time, limb, life, or money-which have no relation to the particular
criminal harm. More primitive societies impose the universal
privations of pain and humiliation upon criminals regardless of their
crimes. In any event, to apply the "eye for an eye" norm literally,
organized communities would have to be prepared, logistically as
well as morally, to do anything that their most depraved individual
members had done. Retribution, therefore, is not about revenge.
Second, retribution is not about domesticating popular hatred for a
known criminal or redirecting repugnance toward a particularly
heinous crime. Retribution does not mean that a state execution is
simply a decorous lynching. Retribution is not driven by anger,
hatred, or any other emotion; as such, it is completely distinct from
community outrage. Indeed, in most times and places, crime causes
little or no outrage. Crime is instead treated as an inescapable part of
the urban landscape, a cost of city living; because it is an expected
effect of social chaos, it is simply tolerated and often unreported.
Third, retribution has little (if anything) to do with the "intrinsic
value" of inflicting suffering on wrongdoers that H.L.A. Hart
suggested. Indeed, Hart's notion that suffering could have any
"intrinsic value" whatsoever is troubling. Suffering is necessarily a
privation, a loss, a difficulty, a subtraction from the way things ought
to be. Suffering so described is bad, and by definition, something bad
does not have "intrinsic value," for if did, it would be good. To me, it
seems likely that what Hart actually had in mind was the fact that we
feel relieved to see the unjust "pay" for their crimes. Yet that view
refers to suffering's instrumental value, however, not its intrinsic
significance.
Fourth, retribution is not the source of criminal law; it is simply a
theory of punishment. Notably, the content of criminal law is rooted
in the whole ensemble of conditions that comprise the common good
of political society. Some of the most obvious and important of these
conditions include respect for basis human rights, such as the rights
not to be intentionally killed or physically harmed by anyone.
Finally, retribution tells us little about what a particular defendant's
sentence ought to be, or even how to define a range of acceptable
5. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 1, 8 (5th ed. 1982).
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punishments for a given crime. Legislative and judicial authorities
necessarily (and rightly) make the important choices in sentencing
about fairness and proportionality, governed by a sense of the
sentence's aptness to the crime and its coherent position within the
global pattern of possible sentences. In other words, while moral
reflection can tell us that assault and theft should be treated as crimes,
it cannot stipulate which privations should be imposed for those
crimes. As such, the sentence for a specific offender is not directly
deducible from any single factor; it necessarily involves a decision
guided, but not dictated, by reason.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL SOCIETY,
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT
In the absence of any established political order, people would do
whatever they pleased. Yet their choices would not necessarily render
society the uncontrollably selfish state of nature anticipated by
Hobbes. 6 Even absent political order, some people would likely act
reasonably, maybe even altruistically, and seek cooperation to achieve
common benefit. But there would be no means through which to
structure that cooperation; each person would have to exercise
personal judgment about the appropriate way to cooperate with
others. Political society, by contrast, provides an authoritative scheme
for structuring cooperation, a scheme which thereby excludes all
reasonable alternatives. Under such a system, individuals naturally
accept these restrictions on their freedom to act on their own personal
judgments about successful cooperation.
The following example, though simple, captures this concept well.
Neither driving on the left side of the road nor on the right is immoral.
Either could easily be chosen as the rule of the road.7 Both, however,
cannot be chosen without disastrous consequences. Refraining from
all authoritative choice would be as catastrophic. After determining
that driving shall occur on the right side of the road, political
authority may then appropriately penalize those who continue to drive
on the left. Legal norms such as this one guide people by specifying
6. See THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 26-31 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthome
eds., Cambridge University Press 1998) (1642).
7. While the United States and 165 other nations drive on the right, 74 nations-
including Great Britain-now drive on the left. Brian Lucas, Which Side of the Road Do
They Drive On?, at http://www.travel-library.com/ general/driving/drive-whichside.html
(last modified Sept. 2003).
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the exact form that fair cooperation with others should take; they
make general moral obligations concrete and explicit. "Drive in an
orderly, consideration fashion" therefore includes an obligation to
yield to cars and pedestrians in the right of way. Further, the law tells
people how to determine who has the right of way under certain
conditions. In short, specific legal norms tell people how to treat
others fairly.
An important conclusion from these premises is that justice
requires individuals to accept the pattern of liberty and restraint
specified by political authorities. By accepting the established
apparatus of political society and by observing its requirements, legal
liberty for all is equalized. The central wrong in crime, therefore, is
not that a criminal causes harm to a specific individual, but that the
criminal unfairly usurps liberty to pursue his own interests and plans
in a manner contrary to the common boundaries delineated by the
law. (Alternately, where the crime is one of negligence, the offender
demonstrates that he is unwilling to make the requisite effort to stay
within the legally or morally required pattern of action or restraint.)
From this perspective, it is clear that the entire community-save the
criminal-is victimized by crime. The criminal's act of usurpation is
equally unfair to everyone else, in that he has gained an undue
advantage over those who remain inside the legally required pattern
of restraint.
8
Depriving the criminal of this ill-gotten advantage is therefore the
central focus of punishment. Since that advantage primarily consists
of a wrongful exercise of freedom of choice and action, the most
appropriate means to restore order is to deprive the criminal of that
freedom. Punishment may include sensory deprivation, even transient
pain, which will likely be experienced by the criminal as "suffering."
Hart notwithstanding, however, the essence of punishment is to
restrict a criminal's will by depriving him of the right to be the sole
author of his own actions. The goal of punishment, in short, is the
undoing of the criminal's bold and unjust assertion of his own will.
Punishment assures society both that crime does not pay and that
observing the law is important; by doing so, it restores fundamental
fairness and equality.
In his wonderful book Praise and Blame, Daniel Robinson poses
8. Punishment may appropriately include an order of restitution to a person specifically
harmed by a given criminal act, but any such specific harm is in addition to that caused to
society at large.
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several questions that any justificatory account of punishment must
answer.9 Robinson first asks why only public authority-and not
anyone at all-has the right to punish offenders, 10 then discusses
whether punishment can ever make things right again, particularly
since the past cannot be undone."1 In addition to answering these
questions competently, retribution also addresses one other important
query: why is it always wrong-without exception-to knowingly
punish the innocent? The remainder of this essay briefly engages each
of these questions.
III. THE VALUE OF PUNISHMENT AS A
REACTION TO SOCIETAL HARM
In his Prolegomenon to Punishment, H.L.A. Hart suggested that
society may impose punishment on an offender only where society
has been harmed. He further identified two types of possible harm to
society: where the authority of law is diminished and where a member
of society is injured. 12 Hart's first category could therefore be taken as
an awkward description of the retributive view described in Part II.
Yet Hart's view of crime and punishment is significantly different
than my own.
Hart understood the excess liberty issues often discussed in the
context of tort compensation. In The Concept of Law, for example,
during his discussion of tort liability, Hart refers explicitly to the
artificial equality that just law imposes upon the inequalities of nature
by forbidding the strong and cunning from exploiting their natural
advantages to cheat or harm weaker or guileless individuals. This
legal equality is disrupted, Hart concluded, whenever a tortfeasor is
"indulging his wish to injure [another person] or not sacrificing his
ease to the duty of taking adequate precautions."' 3 Legal remedies
therefore attempt to restore the "moral status quo" in which victim
and wrongdoer are, once again, on equal footing. 14 Yet Hart was
confident a priori that retribution was solely a matter of inflicting
suffering in return for wickedness, a premise derived in part from his
assumption that punishment was uncontrovertibly defined as the
9. DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME 180-183 (2002).
10. Id. at 182.
11. Id.
12. HART, supra note 5, at 22.
13. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 165 (2d ed. 1994).
14. Id.
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infliction of pain. Perhaps it never occurred to Hart to extend his
initial idea from tort to crime and from victim to law-abiding citizen,
even when-as in Punishment and Responsibility-he seemed very
close to such 
a result.
15
The second harm Hart mentioned-that a member of society is
injured-is equally problematic as an explanation for retribution as I
have described it. Richard Swinburne, in his recommendation of
retributive punishment, indicated that the state only has authority to
impose punishment for criminal harm where it serves as a proxy for
the individual harmed. 16 Swinburne apparently imagines a state of
nature similar to that described by John Locke, in which individuals
hold an exclusive right to punish those who harm them. 17 In a form of
naive contractarianism, joining civil society therefore implies that the
state receives, as if by transfer or delegation, one's natural right to
correct wrongs. 18 If so, however, one might ask whether it really
matters who-individual or state-actually exacts an offender's
deserved punishment.
In this regard, Hart, Swinburne, and Locke are mistaken. Civil
society does not punish as transferee or delegate of the victim. Civil
society punishes in its own name for its own sake because, in truth,
civil society is the victim of each and every crime. Indeed, the onset
of civil society makes punishment possible and intelligible. Civil
society is therefore a necessary condition of punishment, conceptually
inseparable from it.
Further, Hart's two-part theory of punishment cannot explain our
current penal code. Criminal acts often do involve an injustice to one
or more specific persons: the defrauded old lady, the black-eyed
assault victim, the hapless involuntary pedestrian whose car was
stolen. But there are also many "victimless" crimes, such as drug
possession, gambling, and prostitution. Some spectacular offenses
(including treason, espionage, and lying to the grand jury) victimize
the whole community, yet no one in particular, and usually no one
more than any other person. The whole community is similarly
victimized, though less seriously, in pollution or "quality of life"
street offenses like public intoxication. Crimes which arise only after
15. See generally PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5.
16. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 183.
17. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 27l-76 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
18. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 184.
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a distinct, political community is functional-such as treason, perjury,
and public intoxication-have as their victim society as an
undifferentiated community. The manner in which a community is
victimized by these crimes complements the conception of crime
outlined in Part II as a usurpation of liberty. It therefore refers to the
entire community's interest in multiple undifferentiated goods, such
as security (laws against treason), serenity (laws against public
intoxication), and criminal resources (laws against perjury because of
their inherent harm to the criminal justice system).
Finally, there is good reason to simply deny that individuals have
any right to punish others, even in a state-less precursor to modem
society's criminal justice system. Apart from the special case of the
paterfamilias, I would argue that no one has a natural right to punish
others.
My position can be explained in a more formal, yet intuitive
manner. Wicked deeds are a necessary but not a sufficient condition
of punishment. Presume that A misbehaves and that his misbehavior
warrants the judgment: A deserves to be punished. But saying that A
deserves to be punished does not imply that B, C, D, or anyone else
has the right to punish A. Imposing some privation upon a malefactor
is an act that requires its own moral justification. Even in advanced
legal systems, violations of law do not automatically authorize anyone
to punish the violator; only certain officials wielding designated
powers according to the relevant positive law are designated
competent to punish others.
We regularly witness acts of injustice by others-lying spouses,
cruel parents, disrespectful children, cheating colleagues. But it
scarcely occurs to us that each, or any, of us is authorized to punish
those bad actions. We are conditioned by custom, experience, and the
law to suffer criminal harms without becoming a vigilante. We
recognize that police have the right to arrest and courts the power to
punish; we have neither.
IV. PUNISHMENT AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SELF-DEFENSE
Individuals do have a natural right of self-defense, and they are
sometimes required to make their own arrangements to be made
whole where they have received injury. Their actions, as sanctioned
by these two moral guidelines, may look like punishment. But even
the most aggressive responses to crimes in nature need not-and, I
think, should not-be viewed as exercises of some natural right to
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punish. In a town with no sheriff, for example, individuals, families,
or other groups may have to drive off cattle rustlers and forcibly
recover property unlawfully acquired by such offenders. These rights
of defense for person or property and of restitution may closely
resemble punishment. But they are not punishment.
Presume a state of nature in which predatory nomads raid Farooq's
oasis reserve, threaten to injure his family, and then escape with some
of his livestock. When they return, Farooq has gathered friends to
help him fend off or capture the invaders; together they successfully
defend their lives, their homes, and their possessions, subduing and
retaining the raiders.
Now what? Farooq has the right to take back his livestock. But that
would not punish the raiders, because those animals are not theirs
anyway. They belong to Farooq. The raiders, furthermore, might have
no goods of their own to confiscate, and there is no magistrate or jail
to extract justice. Should the raiders be released after a stern warning?
For someone like Farooq, who is responsible for the safety of others,
to be so naive would be to behave irresponsibly. And even if Farooq
could drive them into the desert, they might return again, angrier than
before. Farooq eventually decides, after careful reflection, that the
only way to defend his family and property from these determined
raiders is to hang them. He does so, in a manner which looks much
like capital punishment. Yet Farooq is exercising his right of self-
defense with the only effective means available to him. The only way
for Farooq to restrain his enemies is to kill them.
In this version of a state of nature, the righteous (or at least the
stronger) may seem to be "punishing" malefactors. The bad guys do
get it in the end. But that does not mean that the concept of
punishment is inherent in this violent picture. Natural rights are
indeed necessary to make any moral sense out of Farooq's behavior,
but those rights can and should be limited to the rights of self-help
and self-defense.
V. THE "PUNISHMENT"--OR SACRIFICE-OF THE INNOCENT
The question of punishing the innocent to save others is one of the
great challenges of punishment theory, to which the reader can supply
the predictable details: what if a public authority could stave off riots
and mayhem only by hanging an innocent person popularly believed
to be guilty? The classic example is that of Jesus Christ before
Pontius Pilate. Where retribution forms the moral justification for
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punishment, the problem of punishing the innocent is resolved simply
and satisfactorily. Other theories cannot answer this conundrum so
readily. Under a theory of deterrence, for example, it is impossible to
argue that one innocent must not be sacrificed to demonstrate the
law's fury, if general peace could thereby be secured. The
administration of punishment, whether upon guilty or innocent,
necessarily achieves the desired end of deterrence. Because Hart
understood this fact well, he proposed a bifurcated account of the
justification of punishment: while deterrence justified the institution
of punishment, second order constraints such as retribution limited the
who and how much of punishment. 19
I do not suggest that, in cases of extreme need, it is morally
impermissible for one to pay the ultimate price for the welfare of
many. We have all heard of individuals who stepped into harm's way,
sacrificing themselves for others. Dickens's Sidney Carton and the
passengers on the United Airlines flight that crashed in Pennsylvania
on September 11, 2001, are both examples of people who chose to
risk death in order to prevent harm to others.
Other individuals (such as war heroes) may not have necessarily
volunteered to give up their lives, and yet they typically agreed, in a
lesser capacity, to protect others. Sometimes it may even be said that
the multitudes benefit by conscripting a reluctant heroine. Typhoid
Mary, for instance, spent decades in quarantine on the East River to
protect the rest of us from infection. Her selection was obviously
reasonable: as the source of infection, it would make no sense
(logically or morally) to have quarantined anyone but Mary, yet it
cannot be said that she "volunteered" in the traditional sense of the
word.
20
Sometimes, although fortunately not often, a stranger is called upon
to make the ultimate sacrifice, perhaps the lone passerby who is
directed to undertake a dangerous but necessary assignment. This
apparent disproportion, morally palatable so long as the selection is
fair, may bear an uncanny resemblance to the regrettable execution of
a scapegoat for deterrent purposes.
But the two circumstances are not the same. Scapegoating the
innocent is immoral, for it cannot be understood by those doing the
19. See HART, supra note 5, at 9-10.
20. See generally JUDITH W. LEAVITT, TYPHOID MARY: CAPTIVE TO THE PUBLIC'S
HEALTH (1996).
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scapegoating as punishment at all, for by hypothesis they know that
the individual being sacrificed has done nothing wrong. Passing it off
as punishment necessarily involves deception, for the scapegoat
would have to be declared "guilty" of the heinous act about which the
citizenry is enraged. The scapegoat is thus not selected fairly or
reasonably; rather, he or she is chosen by the mob merely be virtue of
availability, haplessness, or unpopularity. The account of Jesus before
Pontius Pilate is again a fitting example. To the extent that deterrence
requires such scapegoating, it suffers as a normative theory.
In fact, all alternative aims of punishment other than retribution
swing blithely free of specific anti-social acts by the condemned; the
ends can and often are served by "punishing" the innocent. The
utilitarian concerns of tranquility, for example, may be served as well
or better by the sacrifice of innocents. Further, if we consider
rehabilitation in either its therapeutic or moral sense, one can scarcely
argue that the law's ministrations must be limited only to those justly
convicted of a crime. Some people need moral or psychological help,
quite apart from any criminal misbehavior. In all these perspectives,
therefore, the line between guilt and innocence can be traversed
precisely in pursuit of the state objectives. That line will therefore
sometimes seem an arbitrary barrier, which only the scrupulous or
feckless dare not cross.
Conversely, the goal of retribution cannot be obtained by imposing
punishment on the innocent. Punishing someone who has committed
no offense is impossible. It is not that a certain group of people cannot
err simply because they view retribution as the only moral
justification for punishment. In fact, they might act immorally and
"punish" the innocent. But they cannot knowingly punish the
innocent, for if a given person has not distorted equilibrium by
committing a criminal act, any attempts to restore what has not been
disrupted are futile.
VI. Two FINAL CHALLENGES REGARDING RETRIBUTION
We can now address two longstanding questions about restitution
as a justificatory theory of punishment. The first is the mistaken
notion that retribution somehow moves backward while deterrence
anticipates a beneficial societal result (more specifically, less crime).
But if the goal of retribution is to reestablish the balance of political
society, as I have suggested in Parts II and III, it cannot properly be
considered "backward." In that sense, retribution is at least as
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forward-looking as deterrence, in that both theories of punishment
attempt to positively affect society after the incidence of criminal
activity. Indeed, retribution is significantly superior to deterrence in
this regard, since retribution attempts to restore social balance instead
of seeking only to discourage similar criminal behavior (whether by a
given offender or within society at large).
Hart captured the second and related confusion about retribution
with the following question: If, on the last day of civilization, only the
hangman and the condemned remained on the town square, should the
hangman execute the lawfully-imposed sentence? Kant famously
concluded that such an execution not only may proceed but also must
do so,2 1 a position that Hart erroneously assumed was necessarily
held by all retributivists. 22 Hart's assumption, however, is mistaken
for two reasons. First, as discussed previously, the purpose of
retribution is not to make the wicked "suffer," but to restore social
balance. Second, that a person is capable of inflicting suffering on an
offender does not indicate that he is morally authorized to do so. The
hangman's authority to punish (as the presumably faithful remnant of
public authority) is well established. Yet his authority exists solely to
preserve the common good of society, an institution long gone by the
time only the hangman and the condemned remain. In my view, no
one-not even a hangman-may act for the alleged common good of
a nonexistent society. Thus, on the last day of civilization, the
condemned would receive a stay of execution, and he and the
hangman would be left to "work things out" as in a hypothetical state
of nature, such as the one in which Farooq addressed the problem of
pesky raiders.
23
I do not suggest that we entirely abandon other traditional
justifications for punishment, for they may serve as valuable
secondary aims. For example, a retributive system able to effectively
detect crimes and apprehend criminals would also include
considerable deterrence in the traditional sense, namely, the threat of
21. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1965) (1797). See also IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 198 (William Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796).
22. Hart, unlike Kant, believed that a hangman would be morally required to hang up
his noose on the "last day of society." H.L.A. HART, Murder and the Principles of
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 54, 75-76.
23. It is possible that the hangman would eventually kill the condemned, yet the
justification for his decision to do so would no longer be rooted in his role as public
enforcer of common good.
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bad consequences to motivate compliance among those tempted to
commit crimes. Further, retribution also includes a second type of
deterrence, which provides reassurance to the law-abiding that those
who voluntarily obey the laws will not be sacrificed to those who
would not.
The adoption of retribution as the philosophical basis for
punishment therefore provides a powerful, multi-faceted justification
far beyond that proffered by the alternatives. Retribution certainly
includes elements of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but
it also ensures that the guilty will be punished, the innocent protected,
and societal balance restored after being disrupted by crime.
Retribution is thus the only appropriate moral justification for
punishment.
32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 27
